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Summary: 
This article measures the effectiveness of the exchange interventions executed exerted by the 
Colombian Central Bank between 2004-2006 from a relative measure for the size of such interven-
tions and its effects on the mean and variance of the nominal exchange rate in the country in such 
period. The obtained results by means of a relative index of intervention, a GARCH estimation and 
an impulse-response function, indicate that such interventions had little and transitory effects in the 
level and variance of the exchange rate, presenting several day delays and being rapidly dis-
counted by the market. Likewise, it is shown that such interventions, executed in a moment when a 
strong appreciation process of the Colombian peso happened, did not generate inflationary pres-
sures and could moderate, but not revert, the peso/dollar revaluation tendency . 
Key word: Sterilized interventions, exchange regime, managed floating, exchange market, ex-
change rate, portfolio model. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In this article we pretend to evaluate the managed floating strategy of the Co-
lombian Central Bank, which has interfered in the exchange market on a high 
volatility scenario of the nominal exchange rate. Based on a portfolio balance 
model or budget equilibrium for determining the nominal exchange rate, it is in-
tended to verify the effects of the exchange interventions on the behavior of the 
exchange rate during the last three years (2003-2006). We look for estimating a 
GARCH model for the Colombian case which evaluates the effectiveness of the 
bank interventions on an exchange rate functional volatility scenario. Likewise, 
using impulse- response exercises it is aimed to measure the temporal impact of 
the interventions of the Banco de la República. 
The aim of this article is to explain the Colombian exchange course in the 
last years through the measuring of the relative size of the interventions perfor-
med in the period of the peso revaluation, between 2004 and 2006, and calculate 
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the effectiveness of such interventions as well as its effects on the mean or the 
variance of the nominal exchange rate. The main results of this study indicate 
that the interventions of the bank seem to have delays (of even three days) on its 
effect on the exchange rate cycle, and even reacts on the contrary way the same 
day the discretional intervention is performed (that is to say, a dollar buying ma-
kes the exchange cycle decreasing; intervention in small magnitudes only alters 
three days the cycle responses). At the same time, the impulse-response exerci-
ses show transitory effects of the interventions, which are rapidly absorbed by 
the market. 
This article has the following organization. In the second section a theoretical 
discussion on the posture of the economic literature referring the different ex-
change regimes and the effectiveness of the interventions is made. The third sec-
tion discusses the configuration of the exchange policy in Colombia and by means 
of an analysis of some intervention indicators and simple econometric exercises 
the size of the intervention is measured. In the fourth section the budget equili-
brium model is presented and its variation to be used. In the fifth section the eco-
nometric results which assess the pertinence of the discretional intervention and 
its impact on the cycle and variability, at short and medium term, of the exchange 
rate in Colombia are shown. Summary and conclusions are in the last section. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The “trilemma” of the exchange policy demonstrated in the Mundell-Fleming 
model, on the impossibility of accomplishing at the same time a inflation targeting 
(or, have monetary autonomy), a previewed pathway for the exchange rate and 
have free mobility of capital, has been widely accepted in the economic litera-
ture2. Based on this formulation, and having a scenario of free capital mobility, 
Bordo (2003) indicates how the economically correct options for the adoption of 
exchange regimes in the latest times are the called corner solutions: free floating 
(with monetary autonomy) or fixes exchange rate (declining the inflation control). 
The intermediate exchange regimes (where there is a target exchange rate or at 
least a pathway on the time pre established by the central bank) would be com-
pletely fragile or defenseless by a monetary policy due to the lack of an enough 
number of independent instruments. 
For instance, IMF (2005b) lists three basic inconveniences for these interme-
diate systems: i) the central bank delegates part of its power to another country 
and assumes a lost of the monetary autonomy; ii) the target exchange rate may 
tie the central bank to speculative attacks and, in an extreme case, force the 
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bank to make a parity change between currencies, which is not necessary in 
other circumstances; iii) the load of getting a level for the real exchange rate to-
tally falls on the price level, so, when these are sticky, the cost in terms of prod-
uct is very high as it must adjust first to the prices. Fischer (2001) also presents 
good empiric evidence where he showed that during the nineties an important 
number of countries abandoned the intermediate regimes because they did not 
accomplished the former target established with the subjacent exchange ar-
rangements3. 
The world standard is basically nowadays to get low inflation rates4, that is to 
say, the exchange rate is completely determined by the market. This is the sce-
nario the developed economies joined from the beginning of the nineties (mostly 
due to the good results in the control of inflation obtained by the Federal Reserve 
and the Bundesbank, and the everyday more pronounced weakness of the ex-
change control systems), later the Latin American economies led by Brazil and 
Chile, and finally the Asian southeast and European east economies which 
adapted this schema at the end of the century5. 
Nevertheless, Bordo (2003) argues that emergent countries should not adopt 
any of the extreme regimes for the exchange rate for three reasons: i) for the 
possible exposition to monetary crisis (in the free floating case) or bank crisis (in 
the fixed exchange rate case); ii) because of the so called original sin (the record 
of high inflation rates, fiscal laxity and the existence of underdeveloped financial 
markets typical in these countries which cannot be discharged at short term); and 
iii) because the variations in the exchange rate can be totally absorbed by the 
prices, creating inflation pressures. According to the author, these problems 
would suggest that the intermediate agreements may still have a main role in the 
emergent countries. He also points out that countries have had less volatility in 
their currency value and less inflation when there has been a nominal anchor in 
the management of the exchange rate. 
A different approach to the consensus on extreme regimes is in Bofinger and 
Wollmershäuser (2003a and b): a theory of the managed floating. Generally, 
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central banks look for tuning the trajectories in both: the exchange and inflation 
rate6. Table 1, for instance, presents the case of different central banks which in 
2004 intervened in the currency market, even though some of them officially de-
clared to maintain a free floating regime7. This may serve to demonstrate that 
nowadays, central banks tend more to active intervention in the exchange market 
for limiting its volatility, more than any other corner solution when determining the 
nominal exchange rate8. 
Under this scenario, the central bank simultaneously search for two targets of 
monetary policy: inflation control and a pathway for the exchange rate, trying to 
maintain the uncovered interest parity and minimize the social lost function asso-
ciated with the variations on the price of the currency and the return of the capital 
flows9. The key of this theory is to guarantee that the central bank has access to 
two independent monetary policy instruments: international reserves and short 
terms interest rate. To achieve this, an intervention in the exchange market 
should not have meaningful effects on the monetary base and vice versa. So, an 
increment on the amount of net foreign assets should attach to a reduction in the 
net domestic assets, if the intention is to maintain constant the monetary base 
and avoid changes in the exchange market which may affect the short term in-
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ública of Colombia) and by the active intervention in the exchange market (which 
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determined trajectory. When the public expectations are completely compatible 
with the pathway chosen by the central bank (under a perfect behavior of the 
exchange market), the exchange rate and the central bank target are identical.  
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terest rate10. This procedure is known with the name of monetary sterilization of 
the interventions in the exchange market. 
Table 1. Exchange regimes in selected countries and some intervention 
characteristics of their Central Banks 
Country (currency) Exchange 
regime* 
Intervention characteristics 
Argentina (Peso) M.F The Central Bank of Argentina intervenes in the foreign exchange market, but it 
does not determine an exchange rate level. 
Australia (Dollar) F.F. The Bank of Reserves of Australia has the power to discretionally intervene in the 
exchange market. 
Brazil (Real) F.F. By swaps, the Central Bank of Brazil tried to devaluate its currency between Octo-
ber and December of 2005. 
Canada (Dollar) F.F. The Central Bank can intervene in the exchange market for promoting ordered 
market conditions. 
Chile (Peso) F.F. The Central Bank of Chile can intervene in exceptional circumstances. 
Colombia (Peso) F.F. The Republic Bank intervenes the exchange market to define international reserves, 
to control the volatility of the exchange rate and in the search of a determined level 
of the exchange rate by discretional acting. 
Croatia (Kuna) M.F. The Croatia National Bank fixes an exchange rate to apply in transactions out of the 
interbank market to smooth fluctuations. 
Czech Republic 
(Moruna) 
M.F. The Czech National Bank intervenes to smooth the inatraday volatility  
Egypt (Pound) M.F. The Egyptian Central Bank buys and sells foreign currencies daily with the average 
exchange rate fixed by the banks the day before. 
Guatemala 
(Quetzal) 
M.F. The Bank of Guatemala buys foreign currencies on behalf of the public sector. 
Israel (Sheqel) F.F. Authorities have not intervened in the foreign currency market.  
Japan (Yen) F.F. The Central Bank intervenes to counteract the disorders on market. 
Korea (Won) F.F. The Central Bank intervenes to counteract the disorders on market. 
Mexico (Peso) F.F. The Bank of Mexico is been selling dollars daily directly in the foreign currency 
market for the 50% of the previously accumulated international reserves. 
N. Zealand (Dollar) F.F. The exchange rate is free determined by the foreign currency market. 
Norway (Krone) F.F. The monetary policy is anchored on a target inflation frame. 
Paraguay (Guaraní) C N.F. The Central Bank intervenes to smooth the incorrect fluctuations in the price of the 
foreign currency. 
Peru (N. Sol) M.F. The Reserve Central Bank discretionally intervenes to moderate the fluctuations and 
can, extraordinarily, index the bonds to the exchange rate. 
Poland (Zloty) F.F. The value of its currency is determined by the foreign currency offer and demand 
forces, there is not any degree of intervention. 
Singapore (Dollar) M.F. The exchange rate is an intermediate target and dollar fluctuates on a non an-
nounced target band. 
South Africa (Rand) F.F. The South African rand is determined by the forces of the foreign currency market, 
without any degree of intervention. 
Thailand (Thai bath) M.F. The Central Bank daily announces a referent for the exchange rate, based on the 
previous day average, and intervenes only when necessary. 
Turkey (N. Lira) F.F. The Turkey Central Bank reserves its right to intervene in the foreign currency 
market in case of daily excessive volatility in any direction. 
United Kingdom 
(Sterling pound) 
F.F. Authorities may discretionally intervene every time they find incorrect fluctuations in 
the exchange rates. 
United States 
(Dollar) 
F.F. The Federal Reserve may intervene in order to calm down certain disorders in the 
foreign currency market. 
Uruguay (Peso) F.F. The Central Bank reserves its right to intervene to ensure the order on market. 
* M. F.: Managed floating; F.F.: Free floating. 
Source: Personal construction from the IMF (2005). Annual report on exchange arrangements and exchange restrictions. Washington. 
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Sterilization is the way a central bank gets its two instruments independent. 
Fischer and Zurlinden (1999) state: “if the central bank key is the sterilized inter-
ventions, defined as interventions which leave unchanged the monetary base, it 
may not have a meaningful influence on the behavior of the exchange rate”11. But 
they warn: “There is not a permanent effect of the interventions on the exchange 
rate”. Nevertheless, Domínguez and Frankel (1993) list three arguments against 
the effectiveness of the interventions: (i) the relative size of the intervention is small 
with respect to the ampleness of the market, (ii) a ricardian equivalence which 
would discount the effects on time may happen, and (iii) the substitutability be-
tween the international assets may be high12. According to them, only when the 
domestic and foreign bonds are imperfect substitutes (portfolio channel for deter-
mining the exchange rate) or when the central bank public interventions get to alter 
the expectations on the future of the policy (expectation channel), the sterilized 
interventions should have effects on the exchange rate level. 
Finally, Sarno and Taylor (2001) and Schwartz (2000) offer an interesting 
compilation on the discussion on the intervention effectiveness. The analyzed 
bibliography on the first recognizes certain effectiveness to the interventions 
through the two exchange rate determination channels and a third one is pro-
posed (coordination channel). Quite contrary, the second article concludes that, 
except the interventions in Japan, no other case offers meaningful effects of the 
interventions on the exchange rate and signals the impossibility of having two 
targets at the same time13. 
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III. EXCHANGE POLICY EVOLUTION IN COLOMBIA: SIZE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF 
INTERVENTIONS IN THE EXCHANGE MARKET 
The purpose of this section is to analyze the exchange rate behavior in Co-
lombia in force in the period of the free floating regime, emphasizing the role and 
relative size of the interventions of the Banco de la República in the exchange 
market in the period 2004-2006. In 1999, the country moved from an exchange 
rate band to a free floating one in which the Banco de la República committed 
not to interfere on the determination of the exchange rate market and, later, pri-
oritized its target inflation policy. The Bank would only interfere by mean of for-
eign currency buying and selling each time the exchange rate volatility level rises 
(Put options for accumulation of international reserves, Put and Call options for 
control of volatility and Call options for reduction of international reserves). At the 
beginning of the regime good results were obtained as in the reduction of the 
dependency on the exchange rate level to the foreign misbalances, getting de-
valuation tendencies inferior to the ones presented before the end of the band 
regime (figure 1)14. 
Figure 1. Trajectory of the nominal exchange rate in Colombia, 2000-2006 
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Source: Representative market exchange rate of the Banco de la República. 
Later, in more recent years, two well defined phases began. Until the late 
2003, the exchange rate tendency in Colombia was depreciation or devaluation 
of the peso, which had a higher dimension since May 2002. The possible causes 
of this first stage were the fiscal deficit, speculative pressures due to low interest 
rates, big on force risk premium and the international instability characterized by 
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national crisis with great contagious effect15. The second stage began once the 
first ended: appreciation or revaluation of the peso. The positive differential of the 
interest rates, the massive entrance of speculative capital, the growing immi-
grants remittances, the weakness of the dollar with respect to all other curren-
cies, (basically due to the twin deficits and negative reports in the macro 
economic themes had for several trimesters in the Unite States), the bonanza of 
the external sector and the fell in the Colombian debt spread are signaled as the 
causes of this phenomena (see figures 1 and 2) . 
The first stage matched with the creation of a new temporal intervention 
mechanism of the Bank: the options for reducing the international reserves aim-
ing to stop the possible inflationary pressures derived from peso devaluation. The 
second, faced a new turn in the management of the monetary policy: the discre-
tional kind intervention in the exchange market. Table 2 shows the amounts of 
this kind of intervention of the Bank. This mechanism receives some critics, 
mainly for the possible lost of the transparency in the monetary policy in Colom-
bia16, qualities long time recognized to the Banco de la República under the cur-
rent free floating regime. 
Figure 2. Risk level associated to Colombia and interest rate differential * 
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*The interest rate differential is defined as ( ) ( )( )*1 1 1dif i i S S= + − + +∆ , being i the internal interest rate 
(90 day Term Deposit), *i the external interest rate (Libor in dollars to 90 days) and S S∆ the yearly 
Colombian peso depreciation rate with respect to dollar. 
Sources: Term deposit and exchange rates in the Banco de la República; Libor in 
www.economagic.com; EMBI in www.webstation.com. 
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This way, the evolution of a discretional exchange policy in the 2004-2006 
period, represented by the constant interventions of the Banco de la República in 
the exchange market, limit the possibilities for the existence in Colombia of an 
exchange rate free floating17. According to Wollmershäuser (2003), one way, at 
least a priori for determining if a country has a pure floating or otherwise the cen-
tral bank is actively interfering in the exchange market, would be to corroborate if 
the balance of the international reserves stays constant or at least its volatility is 
small. 
Table 2. Interventions of the Banco de la República in the exchange market 
 2004 2005 2006 (April) 
Buying 2904,90 4658,40 1196,70
 Put Options 1579,60 0,00 0,00
  IR accumulation 1399,70 0,00 0,00
  For the control of volatility 179,90 0,00 0,00
 Discretional intervention. 1325,30 4658,40 1196,70
Buying 500,00 3250,00 1168,50
 Call options 0,00 0,00 168,50
  For the volatility control 0,00 0,00 168,50
 National Government 500,00 3250,00 1000,00
Net buying 2404,90 1408,40 28,20
Source: Banco de la República. 
When the exchange policy solely tries to smooth the exchange rate, the be-
havior of the reserves should follow an identical and independently distributed 
process. On the other hand, when a target exchange rate is established, the 
changes in the international reserves present certain degree of persistency. On 
purpose, figure 3 shows the trajectory of the non adjusted net international re-
serves –NIR–, of its cyclic component (result of the Hodrick and Prescott filter  
–HP–) and the variance series of the later (measured through a GARCH model-
ing) for the Colombian case. 
The following is the reasoning: The cyclic component of the NIR show the 
deviation of the reserves with respect to a tendency component estimated by the 
HP filter, that is, would show the deviations due to occasional components or 
short term shock dynamics exerted by the central bank. From this approximation, 
it is noted that by the end of 2004 a great increment on the series variability level 
is given, that is, the wave amplitude is greater and greater. This figure evidence 
on the NIR cycle is confirmed by an estimation GARCH for the variance of the 
cyclic component, which produces a series of the estimated variance of the NIR 
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cycle. This methodology confirms the greater volatility of the reserves since 2004 
(see the inferior panel of figure 3). 
Figure 3. Net International reserve trajectory –NIR–,  
its cyclic component and variability. 
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Source: Original NIR series of the Banco de la República. Millions of dollars. Author’s estimation. 
This result makes think that there has been a transition in the exchange pol-
icy from a free floating exchange rate to a managed floating, without meaning a 
target exchange rate to the central bank. The noticeable persistency in the trajec-
tory of the NIR and the greater volatility on its cyclic component support this hy-
pothesis. Besides, the bank interventions on the exchange market moved from 
random events trying to smooth the variability level of the exchange rate to dis-
cretional factors which have directly influenced its level, affecting its trajectory on 
time. 
In this order, and as an approach to the intervention activity exerted by the 
bank and to value its impact, these interventions on the exchange market can be 
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evaluated according to the relative size with respect to the external sector, that 
is, relative to the offer (exports) and demand (imports) of foreign currencies de-
rived from the trade balance. A practical (and proxy) way to measure the inter-
ventions is by the relative change of the net international reserves, because each 
operation of the bank determines accumulation or reduction or reserves, then we 
can build an index dividing the net international reserves by the size of the exter-
nal sector and taking the first difference in absolute value18: 
1
1 1
2 2
t t
t
t t t t
NIRNIR
I
X Q X Q
−
− −
= −
+ +
(III.1) 
This index measures the relative change in the value of the net international 
reserves from one period to another, as a proxy of the intervention relative size. 
Note that there is not difference between one increment or diminution of the re-
serves (that is to say, between one buy or sell of foreign currency), this is be-
cause the interest of this index is not to show the direction of the intervention, but 
to tell us how the amount of available international reserves, with respect to the 
needs the size of the external sector states, has evolved on time. 
According to this, when the index reports high historical values there could 
be excessive interventions and monetary kind pressures on the inflation control 
would exert (upward or downward, according to the direction of the intervention). 
On the other hand, when the index is in the historically moderated values, we 
could say that the intervention was according to the demands the external sector 
size imposes and this would absorb any monetary kind pressure. Figure 4 shows 
the evolution of this index in Colombia. 
On the left panel of the graphic we have represented the monthly trajectory 
of the index shown in the equation (III.1). Concentrating on the revaluation pe-
riod, in January, March, and July 2005 this index presented three tops, that is to 
say, the absolute change in the international reserves with respect to the size of 
the external sector was meaningful. Nevertheless, excluding these tops, the re-
cent trajectory of the index has even been below the historical average. In fact, 
the historical average of this index (since 1980) is 0.82, while its average since 
August 2004 was 0.52, reflecting a minor intensity in the intervention since its 
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international reserves in that month was c times the monthly size of the external sector, 
measured as the import and export average value. 
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discretional character started, always measured in terms relative to the size of 
the external sector19. 
Likewise, the right panel of the graphic shows the same twelve month accu-
mulated index, and its annual trajectory20: 
12
12 1
1 10
2 2
t i t i
t
t i t i t i t ii
RINRIN
I
X Q X Q
− − −
− − − − − −=
= −
+ +∑ (III.2) 
We can see that after it reached its top in March 2004, it began a downward 
process and during all 2005 it had historical low levels, demonstrating the thesis 
which says that the bank interventions have not been out of the limits the exter-
nal sector size imposes. As the bank has had more freedom for buying foreign 
currencies in the exchange market, and comforted by the growth of the external 
sector, it has not generated great monetary policy risks against the achievement 
of the inflation targets. 
Figure 4. Monthly and annual intervention index: relative change 
of the net international reserves, 1985-2006 
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19
 The average of this index in the peso devaluation period registered between 2002 and 
2003 was 0.76. 
20
 A k value of this annual index would suppose that the international reserves had during 
the last twelve months a variation equivalent to k times the size of the external sector in  
a month. 
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Undoubtedly, the fact that this index is in the normal historic limits, or below 
them, is helping for the growing character of the Colombian foreign trade, which 
duplicated its size between 2003 and 2005. That is, as hypothesis on the im-
pact of the discretional interventions on the exchange policy targets, the possi-
ble financial and inflationary pressures which could have happened during the 
discretional intervention period have been reduced by the growing size of this 
sector and the foreign currency absorption the participants of the foreign trade 
exert. 
So, the interventions on the exchange market would result effective as they 
stopped a devaluation which could have been higher in the case they did not 
exist, without causing conflicts with the achievement of the inflation target. 
Speaking of the effectiveness of the discretional intervention in Colombia, Julio 
and Toro (2005) state: “the interventions obtain the desired effect (a permanent 
increment in the devaluation rate) only if a credible and not ambiguous signal, 
accompanied by meaningful intervention amounts is emitted”. And later they 
continue saying that “the discretional intervention in the exchange market has 
helped moderate the Colombian peso appreciation tendency regarding dollar, 
though it did not revert it. at the same time, it has introduced a greater volatility to 
the exchange rate due to the insufficient credibility of the economic agents on the 
relaxation of the monetary policy and further success of the intervention policy”. 
Figure 5 shows the volatility of the exchange rate, measured by a GARCH 
established on a cyclic component of the daily value of the exchange rate (left 
panel), and by the absolute change of its logarithm (right panel). Accordingly, 
the exchange rate volatility was huge in the late 2002, mid 2003 and early 2005. 
In the late 2002, in presence of the revaluation pressure, the government should 
have intervened on the foreign currency market to avoid the exchange rate lev-
els could affect the inflation compromises for the year. It seemed that one of the 
possible causes for the greater variability in this period (besides the fluctuations 
from the financial markets and the fiscal maladjustments in Colombia and the 
whole world) were the interventions the issuer made for the currency value con-
trol21. 
 
 
 
                                                   
21
 It was specifically about the announced interventions associated with the Call options of 
foreign currency sale (Mesa and Ramos, 2003). 
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Figure 5. Colombian exchange rate volatility, 2000-2006 
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Source: Banco de la República original series. Estimations of the authors. 
Now, analyzing the possible effects of the discretional intervention exerted by 
the Banco de la República since the late 2004, this policy could introduce more 
volatility to the exchange rate until mid 2005, when the interventions (at graphic 
hypothesis level) could have begun to have a minor impact on the decisions of 
the market with which they had some general acceptance or were discounted by 
the agents before its execution. 
No doubt, this intervention issue of the bank in the exchange market leads us 
again to confirm that the current Colombian exchange regime is far from being 
free floating and that the performance of this through time is being determined by 
the intromission of the central bank. It is then necessary to evaluate if the bank 
labor has been successful in the exchange rate control. This evaluation will be 
done in the fifth part, now we will study some theoretical aspect on the exchange 
rate determination. 
IV. THE PORTFOLIO BALANCE CHANNEL: AN EXCHANGE RATE DETERMINATION THEORY 
The aim of this section is to evaluate the determinant of the nominal ex-
change rate in Colombia from a variant of the portfolio balance model. The port-
folio balance channel (or model) (PBC) tries to explain the motives by which the 
investor diversify their portfolio between domestic and foreign assets (the gov-
ernment domestic bonds are in national legal currency and the foreign ones in 
foreign legal currency) due to their expectations on the returns in each country22. 
It is a dynamic model (dynamic because there changes on time in the agents 
                                                   
22
 The explanation to this model is based on Bofinger and Wollmershäuser (2003a and b), 
Domínguez and Frankel (1993), Sarno and Taylor (2001) and Wollmershäuser (2003). 
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decision on the place for investing their richness) for determining the exchange 
rate by interacting among the international asset markets23. The misbalances in 
the current account define the net accumulation or reduction level of international 
assets of a country, its return and the perceived risk level. 
Four markets are considered by these models: two monetary markets (na-
tional and foreign) and two bond ones (national and foreign), determining the 
exchange rate by the interaction of these four markets and the restriction of the 
financial richness. A depreciation increases the value of richness when incre-
menting the value of the foreign bonds maintained by national agents. For this 
motive, every time there is an increment in the exchange rate value a parallel 
increase in the interest rate must happen to maintain the equilibrium in the 
money market. The equilibrium value of the exchange rate is that the owners of 
the financial wealth agree to preserve the totality of the asset levels offered in 
the country. 
The expected return rate depends on the interest rate of both countries, the 
expectations of the agents on changes on the exchange rate and the risk level 
associated to each country. Then, for a given asset supply, in equilibrium, the 
exchange rate differential ( ft ti i− ) must be equal to the expected depreciation 
(
1t t tE s s+ − , being s the logarithm of the nominal exchange rate) plus a risk pre-
mium ( trp ) ,that is to say, the uncovered interest parity must  
be accomplished: 
1
f
t t t t tti i E s s rp+− = − + (IV.1) 
The risk premium is explained due to the existence of the imperfect substi-
tutability in the domestic and foreign assets and because it is supposed agents 
do not like risks. That is to say, when a country has positive levels of risk, must 
offer an extra return for the agents to be ready to acquire the existing bonds offer 
as the owners of the richness maximize their earnings including both the national 
bond risk level and the foreign bond risk one. 
An equation which explains exchange rate determination, supposing the four 
participating markets in this channel are in equilibrium after the decisions of re-
placing the assets subject to changes in profit perceived by agents, would be: 
                                                   
23
 Different to the PBC, the monetary focus of the exchange rate supposes that only the 
amount of money in a country as well as its balance of trade will define the exchange 
rate level. 
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1
f
t t t ttE s i i rp+∆ −= − (IV.1.1) 
Being 
1 1t t tt tE s E s s+ +∆ = −  
This channel is relevant as it explains the effects (and evaluates the effec-
tiveness) of central banks interventions in the exchange market, emphasizing its 
net effects on domestic asset relative supply and demand. After the authorities 
have intervened in the exchange market and have sterilized, intervention may 
have very little, or not effects, on the domestic interest rate, as the monetary 
supply did not change. Nevertheless, the asset owners are not indifferent to the 
currency they are valuing their portfolios and have an exchange rate variation 
associated risk level. As a consequence, what is altered is the agent portfolio 
composition, as the central banks have bought and sold assets in their steriliza-
tion operations and investors have rebalanced their portfolios according to the 
new supply. 
So, the spot value for the exchange rate and the risk premium (given the in-
terest rate differential and the expectations of the exchange rate) should change 
in order to affect the domestic value of the foreign bonds and their expected re-
turn: this is the transmission channel in which interventions affect the exchange 
rate level by mean of the PBC. Also note that from the perspective of the PBC 
sterilized interventions imply that a central bank can define (or at least influence 
in part) the country risk. 
Discretional interventions can also have a direct effect on the cyclic or ten-
dency behavior of the exchange rate. For this motivation, to collect the direct 
effects of these policy strategies we offer to consideration the following variation 
of the PBC: 
( )1 t ft t t ttE s Int i i rpβ δα+∆ + −= − (IV.2) 
Being Int a measure for the bank interventions and the parameters  
, , 0α β δ >  mean the relative answer of the exchange rate to variations in each 
one of the explicit variables. Note that the equation (IV.1.1) has identity proper-
ties, but this new equation (IV.2) provides a direct importance to interventions 
menacing to change the relative effect of the interest differential and risk pre-
mium. 
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V. ESTIMATIONS AND EMPIRIC RESULTS 
A. Using the portfolio balance channel in the cyclic component of the exchan- 
ge rate 
By the described approximation in section IV, in which the Portfolio Balance 
Channel –PBC– was exposed and the possibly existing relationship between the 
exchange rate, interventions, interest rate differential and risk level was identified 
–summarized in the equation (IV.2)–, we try to measure the determinants which 
explain the exchange rate expected values and, specifically, the intervention 
impact in the exchange market (exerted by the Banco de la República). A priori 
we expect the following causality relationships to happen: 
Exchange rate expected variation , ,f interventions differential risk
+ +
−
 
=  
 
 (V.1) 
Nevertheless, there are four difficulties in the series considered which de-
mand transformations on the variables and the use of proxy variables in some 
cases, or special problematic behavior modeling in others. Firstly, all the consid-
ered series are the financial kind (exchange rate, interventions, ¿EMBI measured 
country risk? and interest rate differential) and these series often present sto-
chastic tendencies in their trajectory (they would be one order integrated: unitary 
roots, table 3). 
Secondly, the intervention variable, in the new discretional intervention frame 
adopted by the bank, is secret. For this motive, we need a proxy variable which 
allows us measure somehow the bank activity. As it was done in the second sec-
tion to measure the intensity of the interventions, here we also use the net inter-
national reserves to see (only in part if you wish) the movement made by the 
central bank in the exchange market. The use of this variable has been sup-
ported by Bofinger and Wollmershäuser (2003) and Wollmershäuser (2003) stud-
ies. It makes sense the reserve cycle is the variable which necessarily reacts 
when the central bank buys or sells in the exchange market. 
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Figure 6. Exchange rate and international reserve cyclic component  
and first differences of the EMBI and the interest differential 
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Source: HP filter cycle estimation. For the sources of the original series, see previous figures 
 
Thirdly, all financial market interdependent characteristic, market collective 
determination possibilities, its dynamic responses to past (recent) and contempo-
rary phenomena and the influence of the market participant expectations on the 
values each period financial assets take, make crashes from model endogenous 
variables and other not observed exogenous ones be very persistent, short term 
at least. Finally, as shown in figure 2, the exchange rate variability is too high and 
seems to present its own functionality. 
Exchange intervention... 213 
Table 3. Results on the tests of unitary roots: Phillips-Perron–PP– and Kwiat-
kowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin–KPSS– January 2003 and May 2006 period 
Variable Statistic PP  
(without intercept  
or tendency)* 
P-values of test PP Statistical KPSS 
(with intercept)** 
Stationary 
PP y KPSS 
Lntasa -2.0192 0.0417 3.5769 Yes and no 
Ciclotasa -9.8193 0.0000 0.0257 Yes and yes 
Lncierre  -1.7822 0.0711 3.5729 No and no 
Lnreservas 1.6083 0.9741 3.5657 No and no 
Ciclreser -17.8023 0.0000 0.0123 Yes and yes 
Lnembi  -1.7568 0.0750 2.8871 No and no 
Dlnembi -27.6334 0.0000 0.0634 Yes and yes 
Diferencial  -1.7766 0.0719 1.7846 No and no 
Ddif -25.5962 0.0000 0.0359 Yes and yes 
Definitions: Daily data for Colombia (five day weeks) being lntasa: representative market exchange rate natural 
logarithm, ciclotasa: cyclic component of the representative market exchange rate resulting from HP filter. lncierre: 
every day exchange rate close value natural logarithm. Lnreservas: net international reserve level natural logarithm. 
Ciclreser: net international reserve cycle component Lnembi: EMBI level natural logartihm. dlnembi: first lnembi 
difference. diferencial: see explanatory note of figure 2. ddif: first interest differential difference. 
* The null hypothesis of the PP test is the existence of a unitary root. This hypothesis is rejected at 5% for statistic 
values above (-1.9412). ** The null hypothesis of the KPSS test is the existence of stationary series. This hypothesis 
is rejected for statistic values above 0.463. 
Source: For the exchange rate close value, www.corfinsura.com and for the other series see previous figures. 
The nonstationary variables included in the original model would be solved in 
two different ways. For the exchange rate and international reserve case (this 
late proxy of interventions), looking for short term results and to establish a cyclic 
relationship between these two variables, the cyclic component from Hodrick and 
Prescott–HP–will be used as their transformation. On the other hand, for the 
EMBI and the differential of interest rates the first difference series will be taken 
(figure 6a and table 3). Likewise, for evaluating model delay response, depend-
ent variable lags will be included (AR part), none observed exogenous crash lags 
(MA part) and explanatory variables with their significant lags (altogether it would 
be a Autorregresive distributed lag relationship). Finally, the variance will be 
model by ARCH-GARCH methodology. 
The regression results are in table 4. The estimation was made for maximum 
likelihood to allow variance modeling. The used period is between January 23, 
2003 and May 12, 2006, with daily data from Monday through Friday (for the holy 
days the last working day data was used) with a total of 862 data (before the 
corresponding adjustments due to used differences and lags). The need for an 
ARCH type modeling (variance equation) was corroborated because the square 
residual correlogram concluded, when only the modeling with the distributed lags 
was included, these were not stationary; as a consequence, there would be func-
tional problems to be modeled in the variance. To control the heteroscedasticity 
the Bollerslev-Wooldrige robust standard errors & covariance was used. When 
the two previous correction mechanisms where included (the variance equation 
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and the solution to the heteroscedasticity) the ARCH test (table 4 inferior ex-
treme) confirmed the stationariness of the residuals. 
Table 4. Estimation of maximum likelihood with variance modeling  
for the cyclic component of the exchange rate 
*Significant at 5%. 
Source: See previous figures. 
The variables part of the regression are all meaningful at 5%. The roots of 
the terms AR and MA are inside the unitary circle and the determination coeffi-
cients seem to indicate that a good part of the dependent variable variance could 
be explained. According to the results, the exchange rate cyclic component re-
acts negatively the same day and the next one a foreign currency buy interven-
tion (reserve accumulation) of the central bank, which alter the reserve cycle, 
happens. 
Only the third day there is a devaluation effect on the exchange rate, that is, 
the objective of the bank only consolidates after the intervention is totally known 
in the market and when the expectations of the agents accommodate to a non 
announced news and make decisions on this new scenario (remember that most 
Dependent Variable: CICLOTASA 
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Sample (adjusted): 1/30/2003 5/10/2006 
Included observations: 855 after adjustments 
Bollerslev-Wooldrige robust standard errors & covariance 
Variable Coefficient standard Errors 
CICLORESERVAS -0.003901* 0.001488 
CICLORESERVAS(-1) -0.003242* 0.001635 
CICLORESERVAS(-3) 0.003205* 0.001411 
DDIF -498.9270* 37.86709 
DDIF (-1) -365.0851* 45.26939 
DDIF (-2) -274.5937* 47.71574 
DDIF (-3) -121.3013* 42.20914 
D(EMBI(-1)) 0.029262* 0.013366 
AR(1) 0.711053* 0.035844 
MA(1) 0.338502* 0.043621 
Variance Equation 
C 0.883234* 0.381908 
RESID(-1)^2 0.200327* 0.035932 
GARCH(-1) 0.807646* 0.026420 
R-squared 0.742278 Log likelihood -2793.377 
Adjusted R-squared 0.738605 Inverted AR Roots  0.71 
S.E. of regression 7.485448 Inverted MA Roots -0.34 
ARCH Test: 
F-statistic 0.081367 Prob. F(1.852) 0.775523 
Obs*R-squared 0.081550 Prob. Chi-Square(1) 0.775207 
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of the time interventions had a discretional character). Nevertheless, from the 
obtained result we can say the impact is very low and with little power to change 
the orientation of the exchange rate, at least on its cyclic component. 
Anyway, we must emphasize that the variable used in this study (net interna-
tional reserves) is determined by other capital flows which do not belong to the 
precise intervention labor, but do define the daily accumulation level of the re-
serves. Nevertheless, we can expect the cyclic component here used to collect 
most of the shock activity of the Banco de la República. 
The interest rate differential of the interest rate has a negative effect on the 
short term exchange rate, due to its very strong answer to the return changes 
among countries (which the portfolio balance model predicts). The interest differ-
ential has been the most determinant on the short term exchange rate level, ac-
cording to the magnitude of the other coefficients. Finally, the country risk would 
also be considered in the exchange market, but a period later. It seems the 
agents decisions are based on the country risk variations the day before negotia-
tions24. 
The other coefficients only demonstrate that deviations on the interest rate, 
compared with their previous day tendency, affect today’s value and that also the 
exogenous shocks on the mean of the cyclic component would only have one 
day effect. Likewise, the variance levels and the shocks on it would determine 
the exchange rate variability level only next day. 
B. Impulse-response analysis on the portfolio balance model 
We saw that in short term the possibilities of interfering in the exchange rate 
cycle were greater but little at the third day of operating in the exchange market. 
But we have not answered yet how long lasting those effects may be. The persis-
tency degree on each variable effects, especially those interventions of the cen-
tral bank on the currency value, must be established looking for an a priori and 
proxy approximation of the short term trajectory. To answer this doubt, we esti-
mated the variable relationships with a VAR and then calculated the impulse-
response functions derived of this estimation. 
For applying the VAR we placed all the variables in first differences (as the 
previous literal modeling corresponded to the explanation of the exchange rate 
cycle), as our target is still to analyze the relative changes caused on each vari-
                                                   
24
 A detail to consider is that for the estimation reference period, a strong country risk fall 
happened, partly because of the effect of devaluation on the country borrowing capacity. 
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able from a determined point, more than explaining the level itself. So, by now we 
do not pretend to present hypothesis on the long term variable common trajec-
tory. The only objective up to here is to obtain the size and duration of the bank 
intervention effect by a change in the international reserve level caused by a 
shock on the perturbation term associated to this variable25. 
The first step is to see the length of the lag which is suggested by the differ-
ent associated tests. All of them conclude that the optimal lag which guarantees 
white noise residual is two (table 5). As our objective is not to get the VAR, we 
will concentrate on the results of impulse response graphics. The figure 7 shows 
us the corresponding results. The exchange rate response to a shock on the 
perturbation term, called innovation, associated to the interventions variable is 
analyzed. 
Table 5. Lag length test and VAR autocorrelation 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
Endogenous variables: D(LNCIERRE) 
D(LNDIF) D(LNEMBI) D(LNRESERVAS)  
Exogenous variables: C  
Sample: 1/23/2003 5/12/2006 
Included observations: 851 
Lag LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 NA 0 -26,3 -26,3 -26,3 
1 305 0 -26,6 -26,5 -26,6 
2 149,8* 0* -26,8* -26,5* -26,7 * 
* indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
LR: sequential modified LR test statistic; AIC:  
Akaike information criterion; SC: Schwarz information 
criterion; HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion. 
 
VAR Residual Portmanteau Tests for Autocorrelations 
H0: no residual autocorrelations up to lag h 
Sample: 1/23/2003 5/12/2006 
Included observations: 857 
Lags Q-Stat Prob. Adj Q-Stat Prob. df 
1 1,15 NA* 1,15 NA* NA* 
2 3,80 NA* 3,81 NA* NA* 
3 19,04 0,27 19,10 0,26 16 
4 28,13 0,66 28,23 0,66 32 
5 45,40 0,58 45,60 0,57 48 
6 64,73 0,45 65,07 0,44 64 
*The test is valid only for lags larger than the VAR  
lag order. 
df is degrees of freedom for (approximate) chi-square 
distribution. 
 
The bank interventions permit an immediate rise on the exchange rate varia-
tion (contrary to what happened on the previous apart, when only three days later 
there was influence on its cyclic level). This effect becomes negative after the 
third day (second moment) and has presents another positive effect the sixth and 
seventh day (third movement). We imagine these two last effects are due to the 
market reaction to the intervention. 
                                                   
25
 To avoid contradictions on the unitary root test, we will use the daily exchange rate 
close value in first differences in this part, not the RMR we used before. 
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Figure 7. Impulse response function for the exchange rate on  
a portfolio balance model 
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In the second moment agents strongly react to the operation of the market on 
the opposite way, for instance, if the bank is buying dollars and these have al-
ready increased price, they will use some reserves they have for taking profits, 
making the intervention an explanation to the exchange rate variation lows. Then, 
on a third moment, the pressure reverts due to the lack of enough funds to conti-
nue the foreign currency supply on market and variation becomes positive again. 
After these seven days, the central bank intervention seems to have no effects on 
the economy devaluation rate and this goes back the levels previous to the shock. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Managed floating has become one of the main challenges to current mone-
tary policy, mainly in emerging countries. As signaled, the impossible trinity of the 
monetary policy which used corner solutions for the management of the ex-
change rate is being rebated from different angles. From the theory, the models 
summarizing the managed floating are more and more popular, increasing the 
number of economists supporting the idea of the active participation of central 
banks in the exchange market, intending to get a pre set pathway for the cur-
rency value. These have more and more echo in economic literature. In practice, 
likewise, sterilized interventions have become a tool by which banks assume an 
active role in the exchange rate value without causing big (or none) inflationary 
pressures. 
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In Colombia, under the characteristic pressures of the free floating regime, 
where market and its shocks make the currency value present great variability 
and long tendencies, managed floating became the internal monetary policy de-
sign. The growing variability in the international reserves and the discretional 
interventions exerted by the bank are laudable examples of this case and the 
active role of the central bank on the path of the exchange rate. Nevertheless, 
the exchange intervention index, measured by the change in the net international 
reserves, show that interventions in the 2004-2006 period have not generated 
great risks of monetary policy against the achievement of the inflation goals, as 
the index has been into the historically normal levels or bellow them. 
The effectiveness of this kind of intervention in the exchange market was 
evaluated under the exchange rate determination frame by mean of portfolio 
balance channel or budget equilibrium. According to the results, interventions 
have not affected the exchange rate tendency on market, this from the answer of 
its cyclic component. That is, the international reserve change affects the short 
term exchange rate in little proportions and opposite way at first. On the other 
hand, we saw that the exchange rate cycle is mainly determined by the interest 
differential, while the country risk hardly exerts a little pressure on the currency 
value cyclic level (or short term). Likewise, we realized the central bank interven-
tions do not have a long term character, that is, each activity effects rapidly fade 
on market and do not affect the tendency level, or the currency value long term 
growth rate. 
This study verified then that exchange interventions did not have a meaning-
ful effect on the exchange rate tendency. Nevertheless, during the analyzed pe-
riod, interventions did not generate monetary disorders which would compromise 
the Banco de la República projected inflation target. 
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